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Introduction  
The HEPRO project is a part of the Healthy Cities approach that seeks to put health high on 
the political and social agenda of cities, and to build a strong movement for public health at 
the local level in the Baltic Sea Region (Østfold County Council 2005). The concept is 
underpinned by the principles of the Health for All strategy and Local Agenda 21. Strong 
emphasis is given to empowerment; including equity, participatory governance and solidarity, 
intersectoral collaboration and action to address the determinants of health. HEPRO is further 
a project which aim is to integrate health consideration into spatial planning and development 
and to make an important contribution to a sustainable public health policy in Europe.  The 
HEPRO project approach is characterised by: 
• A spatial and cross-sectoral focus on public health 
• A system theoretical approach to policy production 
• A circular understanding of planning 
 
The spatial and cross-sectoral focus  
The HEPRO project builds on the understanding that the public health is influenced from 
every sector in the society and that the main purpose of the public health work is to obtain 
collaboration processes between the sectors in order to prevent negative and promote positive 
consequences on people’s health. This process is a combination of top down and bottom up 
policy making, and is a broad social learning and mobilisation activity that is supposed to 
enhance the individual and collective capacity in local and regional communities to take care 
of the public health. 
This understanding is similar to the recent understanding of regional planning and 
development work. The regional planning systems in the Nordic countries can illustrate a 
number of recent changes which point towards increased similarities with other European 
planning systems.  The most obvious one is the emergence of a regional level, a trend which 
is definitely related to European spatial development policies (Böhme 2002). In addition, 
Bőhme points to another trend that has become evident, the increasing cross-sectoral 
perspective. It may be too early to talk about a trend towards overcoming the strong sector 
orientation of Nordic spatial policy, but there are at least initial signs of approaches to a more 
integrated spatial planning. 
 3
The term regional planning is used to cover the spatial regional planning and the sectoral 
regional planning (Amdam 2004). The spatial planning focuses on the region as a society, 
and sectoral planning focuses on planning in organisations in the society (municipalities, 
counties, etc.). I find this use of the terms to be in accordance with a common understanding 
of spatial planning:  
Spatial planning refers to the methods used largely by the public sector to influence the 
future distribution of activities in space. It is undertaken with the aims of creating a more 
rational territorial organisation of land uses and the linkages between them, to balance 
demands for development with the need to protect the environment, and to achieve social 
and economic objectives. Spatial planning embraces measures to co-ordinate the spatial 
impacts of other sectoral policies, to achieve a more even distribution of economic 
development between regions than would otherwise be created by market forces, and to 
regulate the conversion of land and property uses. (European Community 1997:24) 
 
The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) was adopted in May 1999 in 
Potsdam by the informal Council of EU Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning, and the 
shaping of the perspective has been a fragile and uncertain process. ESDP creates a common 
vocabulary of symbols and visions in the discourse of the European spatial development, and 
the perspective has a triangle of objectives linking the following fundamental goals of 
European policy (European Community 1999:10): 
• economic and social cohesion, 
• conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage,  
• and more balanced competitiveness of the European territory. 
 
These objectives are further developed in spatial development guidelines and specified in a 
number of policy aims and options (European Community 1999:11). One of the guidelines is 
the development of a polycentric and balanced urban system and strengthening of the 
partnership between urban and rural areas. This involves overcoming the outdated dualism 
between city and countryside. In order to understand these perspectives and guidelines, we 
have to remember that the long-term spatial development trends in the EU are above all 
influenced by three processes:  
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(1) the progressive economic integration and related increased co-operation between the 
Member States,  
(2) the growing importance of local and regional communities and their role in spatial 
development, and  
(3) the enlargement of the EU and the development of closer relations with its 
neighbours.  
The translation of the objectives and options into concrete political action shall take place 
gradually.  The European Spatial Development Perspective shall, therefore, periodically be 
subject to review. However, we have to remember that European Union polity is a complex 
multilevel institutional configuration that cannot be adequately represented by the theoretical 
models that are generally used in international relation and comparative policies (Scharpf 
2001: 20). The models that exist will have specific implications for how we regard the 
institutional capacity and legitimacy of the European governing functions. The separation of 
political power between the different levels will anyway be an important issue in spatial 
planning and development. The integrated policy concept of ESDP, as mentioned above, 
requires new ways of co-operation between levels and new ways of handling sectoral and 
spatial conflicts. The application of the policy options is based on the principle of subsidiarity 
and according to the ESDP’s principles; the implementation shall be on a voluntary basis.  
There is thus a need for close co-operation amongst the authorities responsible for sectoral 
policies; and with those responsible for spatial development at each respective level 
(horizontal co-operation); and between actors at the Community level and the transnational, 
regional and local levels (vertical co-operation).  
The European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) has been set up with the 
purpose of providing an analytical base for ESDP agenda, and has produced significant data. 
However, meanwhile the work on establishing a Constitution for Europe has identified 
territorial cohesion as an objective for the Union, and the ESDP agenda has been modified 
under the flag of territorial cohesion (Faludi 2006).  
Anyway, from my point of view there are several problems in the planning system deriving 
from the ESDP and territorial cohesion policy. First of all, we have the horizontal 
coordination problem when the regional policy making and implementing is expanded from 
the public sector to include voluntary and private sector in networks and partnerships.  Then 
we have the vertical coordination problem with the extreme difficulty balance between top 
 5
down and bottom up policy in the multilevel power structure of the union. At last, we have the 
problem with creating processes and institutions with enough accept, power and legitimacy to 
coordinate vertically and horizontally, this can be called the policy instrument problem.   
Public health work and regional planning and development do in this field face the same 
challenges in the modern societies. The regional territorial and horizontal power seem to be 
weak compared to the sectoral and vertical power, and it can be argued that the situation in 
general is a consequence of the modernization process in our societies (Giddens 1997, 
Habermas 1984 and 1995). In this process, instrumental rationality and top down policy seem 
to dominate over the communicative rationality and bottom up policy. In order to fully 
understand these challenges, we have to clarify the terms instrumental and communicative 
rationality. Instrumental rationality tells us how to combine the means to achieve given ends, 
and is appropriate for goal-oriented behaviour within a means-end structured problem area. 
Planning based on instrumental rationality can lead to bigger local and regional dependency 
on external institutions and forces. It can also weaken the local communities’ capability to 
learn and to handle challenges (Stöhr 1990). Dryzek (1990) blames the instrumental 
rationality for many of the crisis in the world, and argues that the cure is communicative 
rationality and discursive democracy with participatory democracy, communicative action 
and practical reasoning. The term communicative rationality comes from Habermas (1984 and 
1987) who argues that communicative rationality is a property of inter subjective discourses, 
not individual maximisation, and it can pertain to the generation of normative judgements and 
action principles rather than just to the selection of means to ends. Communicative rationality 
is rooted in the interaction of social life, and is oriented towards inter subjective 
understanding, the co-ordination of actions through discussion, and the socialisation of 
members of the community. Communicative rationality is found in speeches meeting the 
validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, rightness and sincerity, and at the same time 
aiming for mutual understanding and agreement. Habermas argues that this ideal speech 
situation can promote democracy and personal growth. However, communicative rationality 
cannot totally replace instrumental rationality, it can only restrict the latter to a subordinate 
domain (Habermas 1995).   
Instrumental rationality points towards the gains that the society can show through economy 
and science and has formed the foundation for understanding modernising as an expression of 
progress, and that progress is associated with better efficiency and rationalising. If we use the 
instrumental rationality as a foundation for reforms in the “modern state”, the state would 
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become a more efficient instrument to produce output and outcome. But many argue that this 
is not enough to legitimate the modern state. I addition we have to raise the question to what 
extant the state has become more democratic, just and humane. Eriksen (1993) substantiates 
this by asking if there is done enough to ensure that every group and their needs, interests and 
demands for respect are being looked after. Eriksen also asks if the public sector activities are 
in accordance with valid moral and the standard court justice. He finds great shortages in 
today’s presumption of modernising, and he argues strongly for the usage of other forms of 
rationality, especially communicative rationality.  
Friedmann (1992) states that the modern societies suffer under the instrumental rationalities 
and the neglect of communicative rationalities and collective processes. He argues that the 
solution to the problem is to mobilize the territorial power to meet the sectoral power in a 
political process. In a regional policy context and in public health work this means that the 
bottom up and mainly communicative power can equalise the top down and mainly 
instrumental power and thus contribute to building of adequate regional development 
institution. 
But local and regional communities cannot be seen as units that are more or less independent 
of central government and external companies. Nor are communities that lag behind 
necessarily units that are strongly dependent on superior governing institutions and external 
enterprises. The promotion of a community development in general and in public health 
policy requires that the communities itself take more responsibility for its development as a 
political actor. Thus the communities have a strong need for regional institutions, which can 
work on a collective level to promote the communities’ needs, interests and values in the 
mainly political power structure where the different sectors’ knowledge and actions dominate.  
From this perspective, it becomes logical to empower local and regional communities to 
oppose the dominating vertical and instrumental power structure (Friedmann and Weaver 
1979). This process can be called an empowerment process. However, empowerment is used 
in different ways by different authors, and need to be clarified. In the HEPRO-project the 
definition of empowerment is very simple: Helping people to help themselves, or leading 
people to learn to lead themselves. This involves a strengthening of the horizontal power 
structure through activating the civil society, the elected representatives, and through local 
embedding of private businesses. In this way, horizontal political power can be organised to 
supplement and oppose the sector dominated and vertical power structure.  Many researchers 
agrees upon this point of view and see the local community with a strong civil society and a 
 7
strong democratic process as the main key to a empower local and regional communities; see 
among others Bennett and McCoshan (1993), Putnam (1993), Forester (1993) and Storper 
(1997). 
However, in this perspective communities as regions are not a fixed structure, and regional 
institutional capacity building is a process (Paasi 1986, Healey 1999, 2001). Regimes, 
partnership, networks, coalitions and institutional thickness have to be constructed and 
managed (Amin and Thrift 1995). Thus, the new regional political institutions need a political 
capacity building process to make them legitimate political actors (Healey 1997). Regional 
planning and public health becomes a policymaking process and a question about having 
political power.  
The systemic approach to policy making 
The HEPRO regards public health work as policy making and views the policy process in a 
system theoretical perspective. The systemic approach to policymaking processes is well 
known form different authors, and has been developed since Easton (1965), as one of the first, 
used it.  In the simplest form, the system model has an input, production and output element, 
and a feed back loop from the output to the input element. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) have 
one of the latest contributions to the systemic approach, and a much elaborated model that 
puts focus on important political and public issues (see figure 1).  
According to this system model, political processes can as a rough sketch be illustrated by the 
left side representing the input for the decision process. The decision process is an arena 
where certain rules for how to make decisions can be introduced, and the right side of the 
model is the output of the decision process. The model catches the fact that actors outside the 
system of power through fighting for their values, interests and needs can influence the 
structural power that in time has been integrated in the system of power, i.e. presumptions, 
action patterns, routines, rules and so on. In addition, the model catches the fact that the 
structural power can influence and socialise actors trying to achieve changes. Consequently, 
the model also gives an illustration of power not being a fixed variable, but subject to changes 
in both time and space.         
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Figure 1: The policy process 
 
Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004:106) 
 
The model illustrates the different dimensions of power as defined by Lukes (1974). He has 
made a fundamental statement on this topic, and distinguishes between three dimensions in 
the execution of power. Actors in this context can be individuals, groups, organisations and 
political institutions, and they can act both intentionally and unintentionally. This dimension 
involves an instrumental attitude towards power where the practising of power involves that 
actor ‘A’ gets actor ‘B’ to do an action ‘a’ even if he would prefer action ‘b’. One criteria for 
being able to talk about the execution of this sort of power is that it is observable. This means 
that there has to be a visible conflict between actor A and B, and that the action executed can 
be separated from the action superseded. This form of execution of power represents an 
operational form of power where one actor has the power to control another actor’s actions. 
We can also say that in relation to the model, the one-dimensional form of power represents 
the output side of the model. In other words, to what extent the political institution has the 
power to control how its solutions for actual problems are being carried out. The output side 
of the model can involve problem solving in relation with the resolution, but can also involve 
symbolic problem solving, escaping from the problem and unintended consequences. The 
execution of power can involve different asymmetric forms where one of the parts dominates 
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the other, for instance through commandments, requests and teaching. But it can also be 
negotiations between equal parts. Lukes (1974) calls this form of execution of power one-
dimensional, because it disregards other important forms of the execution of power.          
In addition to the dimension above, this form of execution of power also focuses on the fact 
that power execution can be not making any decisions at all. In the model this is called the 
activity and in other models it can be called the throughput side of the policy process. The 
third dimension of power represents control of the political agenda. In relation to the model, 
this involves having control of the input side, that is to have a significant influence on for 
instance what people think and care about and how strongly people argue their case. 
Execution of power of this dimension can prevent minorities from developing into majorities 
and consequently it involves some anti-democratic patterns of action. On the other side does 
the three-dimensional view of power allow people to mobilise and put their problems and 
solutions on the political agenda, eventually replace actors or set up new political institutions. 
For the HEPRO Healthy City project on the main goals are to put health high on the political 
and social agenda of cities and to build a strong movement for public health at the local level. 
This goal is a concrete expression of the three-dimensional view of power. 
The political system model can also be used to illustrate the outcome problem in public sector 
caused by the New Public Management (NPM) reform wave. The first generation of NPM 
public reforms brought new thinking and processes into public sector, but much of them in the 
form of management borrowed from private sector. In this process, the well-established terms 
public sector and public administration became discredited, and private sector was put 
forward as an example to follow. The term public sector became very much associated with 
an inefficient rule-bound system in contrast to the efficient private sector. Hence, the reforms 
focused on transforming the input managed rule-bund system to a more output and even 
outcome managed performance system. Management-by-objectives concepts and activity 
planning became central in the reforms. According to OECD (2003) this approach with 
emphasis on formal system of specification of ends and measurement of output and outcome 
failed decades ago, not only in private sector but also in the public sector in the command 
economies, because in could not address complex problems and because there are limits on 
how much information human beings can (or do) take into account when they make decisions. 
In addition, there is no area of activity more complex than the policy domain of government, 
and it has for a long time been recognised that public service production is controlled more by 
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values and culture than by rules, a situation that is likely to continue despite progress in 
performance measurement and contracts. 
The NPM reforms have made marked competition an end in itself. Other values as 
democracy, participation, equality etc. normally become more or less neglected. The NPM 
reforms have empowered customers through free chooses of services, free managers from 
detailed political instructions, and strengthen political steering through defining the long-term 
goals for the public sector and asserting the outcome (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). 
However, these three tings are difficult to achieve simultaneously (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2000), and the consequence is a fragmentation of the national stats and an increased sector 
thinking and acting (Christensen and Lægreid 2004). 
Thus, the NPM reforms make public organisations become more like private sector 
organisations with a dominance of internal focus. One of the main reasons is that the 
politicians are not able to hold the public sector managers responsible for the outcome or the 
results of the policy implementation, only the output. This lack of outcome accountability 
gives the public sector organisations the possibility to act in an egoistic way, and makes it 
extremely difficult to realise outcome, such as sustainable public health, through the existing 
political sector structure. There is a strong need for new institutions based on networking and 
partnership, but the fragmentation of the political power structure actually reduces the ability 
and willingness to participate in these network organisations. Then the nearest solution should 
be more accountability, but then the problem is the lack of causality in production of public 
sector services. When there is no obvious logical relation between a public sector organisation 
output and the outcome to the society, you cannot hold the organisations and their leaders 
responsible. 
Demands for better accountability and improved performance have resulted in administrative 
reforms that emphasise new leadership and leadership development models. In this process 
we tend to evaluate public and private sector leaders much the same way, i.e. by their ability 
to lead their organisations to perform. However, it is commonly recognised that public sector 
has a fare more complex and dynamic value and goal structure, than private sector. There is 
now a growing awareness that something is missing between the existing public service 
culture and the public interests. There seem to be a lack of dedication to fundamental values 
of public services such as separated powers, democracy, transparency, accountability and 
efficiency. If these values shall guide the public sector actions, they must be embedded in the 
culture. The public sector seem to have a very strong need for institutional leadership, i.e. 
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leaders with dedication and ability to put on the policy agenda fundamental values of public 
services such as separated powers, democracy, transparency, accountability, efficiency. 
Therefore public health work becomes a leadership issue and it becomes obvious that leaders 
must be involved in the process. However policy making is a continual process and it is not 
enough to put the values, needs and problems on the agenda, they have to be kept there and 
the system must produce adequate outputs and outcomes.   
The planning circle 
The HEPRO project uses planning as a tool in the policy making process, and in accordance 
with the understanding of policy making as a continual process, planning is understood as a 
circular process, see figure 2.  I will stress that when the circle is used as a metaphor, is it 
important to understand that after one circuit, the participants in the process are not back 
where they started. The situation is changed and the people involved have most certainly been 
learning. I addition, it is important to stress that the different stages in the circle do not have to 
follow a fixed order. Implementation of one public health activity can go on simultaneous 
with efforts to create attention and to put another activity on the political agenda.   
 
Figure 2: HEPRO Planning circle 
 
Source: Østfold County Council (2007) 
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The different stages of the circular process are presented like this in the HEPRO Healty City 
project:  
• Attention; Mapping the situation that has an impact of the public health work through 
a SWOT- analyse.  
• Insight and new knowledge; Mapping the situation gives new insight about local 
matters through a survey. 
• Building a platform for joint action; Based on insight and knowledge from step 1 and 
2, the project have to work out an action plan and cross-sectoral workgroups must be 
established. 
• Implementation; Activities will be carried out in cooperation with local partners. 
• Documentation; Data from all activities that have been carried out must be collected in 
a systematic way as a basis for later evaluation. 
• Evaluation; The last step in the planning circle is an evaluation of structure, process 
and results. The results from the evaluation will give input to the starting point for a 
new planning circle. 
 
The circular model of planning is in contrast to the instrumental rationality and the traditional 
linear model of planning. In the linear model the focus in on relating means (how to do thing) 
to ends (what could be achieved), in logical and systematic ways, and scientific knowledge 
shall provide an objective basis for identifying present problems and predicting future 
possibilities (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Instrumental and linear planning  
 
Knowledge
Power
Actions
Expert Client  
 
 
A prerequisite for this planning is, among other things, that at the moment of decision there is 
full awareness of the present situation and clear and unambiguous objectives for the future; so 
that it is possible to choose which alternative offers the best course of action (Simon 1965).  
The instrumental rationality and planning is strongly connected with the positivists’ theory of 
knowledge. The presumption here is that objective knowledge can be gained through a 
scientific, hypothetical-deductive process. The controlled experiment stands as the methodical 
ideal. The founding doctrine for positivism is to clear the world of religion and mysticism, 
and to achieve control of society through knowledge and technique. The only true views of 
the world were those, which were based on empirical observations. Assertions, which were 
not testable in an analytical or empirical way, should be disregarded entirely. This positivist 
science ideal causes an interest towards research aimed at unveiling connections between 
cause and effect and establishing “laws of societies”. 
Friedmann (1978) starts by establishing that the positivist epistemology is dominant in our 
time. It has three levels or worlds as Friedmann calls them: Practice, technology and science 
(World 1, World 2, World 3). The real science and the objective knowledge can be found in 
World 3 in this model. World 2 use this knowledge to develop techniques, and World 1 is the 
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world where this technique is practised. This epistemology is based on the definition of 
objective knowledge. This means that it is possible to come up with knowledge that is 
independent of any knowing subject.  
Schön (1983) claims that positivism has led to practise as an instrumental professional activity 
where the process of solving problems is made rigorous by the use of science, theory and 
technique. The participants have formed professions based on among others the following 
characteristics: basic knowledge, used science and action competence. Some of these actors 
have through use of the positivist science ideal made systemised bases of knowledge with 
four important capabilities. The knowledge is specialised, stabilised, standardised and 
scientific. These actors have made what Schön calls over-professions based on codified 
knowledge. Some of the other actors can be called under-professions. I will say that typical 
examples of these under-professions can be planners, public health and social workers and 
any other who base their knowledge on participation in social interaction. These people are 
not capable of making a basis for systematic scientific knowledge, because the same actions 
will give different results in different contexts. The competence of action is weakened this 
way, because the coherence between knowledge and actions is complex and labile, and much 
of the adequate knowledge is tacit, and personally and locally embedded.  
Schön (1983) asks us to eagerly admit the weaknesses of instrumental rationality and rather 
seek for an epistemology which is based upon practice in creativity and intuitiveness similar 
to that which the practitioner use when they face unique situations with uncertainty, conflicts 
and instability. Schön introduces and uses the word reflective practitioner, and writes that 
when we reflect during actions we ourselves become researchers in a practical context. We 
think of what we can do while we do it. We do not depend upon theories or techniques; we 
make theory out of cases. This way of rationality is suitable for handling uncertainty, because 
it does not separate ends and means, knowledge and actions, planning and implementation 
from each other. These are developed interactively. After a while we will have both a codified 
and a tacit knowledge that we base our actions upon. However, the tacit knowledge can be a 
weakness with the reflective practitioner. Specialists, for instance, have a great deal of 
uncodified tacit knowledge based on earlier experiences. Thus, they can be regarded as 
boring, exhausted and over-educated, and they can also have been dragged into patterns of 
action with mistakes they cannot correct, and therefore become inattentive to situations not 
fitting into their established patterns of actions. The reflective practitioner must therefore 
involve him- or herself with communicative situations where these irrational actions can be 
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revealed and corrected. Schön (1983) suggests, however, that instrumental rationality is a 
process for problem-solving, but not for problem-formulating. He claims this by saying that 
instrumental models of action do not catch the real world. The model cannot handle 
uncertainty in forms of non-stability and complexity, and it is not capable of handling 
conflicting needs, interests and values. Towards the end, he ads that instrumental rationality is 
not the only point of view existing, there are other competing forms of rationality.  
Schön (1986) does not refer to Friedmann’s work, but the intention of Friedmann (1978) was 
to make an alternative epistemology for use in social contexts as a substitute for the 
epistemology occupied with objective knowledge based on the positivist science ideal. 
Friedmann (1978, 1987, 1992) rejects the positivist science ideal, and thus also the deductive 
research design’s approach to obtain objective knowledge through verifying and falsifying of 
hypotheses. Friedmann put forward the epistemology of social practise as an alternative to the 
positivist epistemology. Friedmann means this epistemology can be traced back to Aristotle 
because social practise refers to moral actions in public connections, and because actions are 
based on norms regarding how we are supposed to live along with each other. Friedmann’s 
epistemological model has one world and one living theory that place the facts inside the 
world. In this model, learning is linked to the world of events via social actions and the result 
of that action. The adequacy of the theory of reality, and/or the political strategy is therefore 
dependent on the results of action and the extent to which these results satisfy the given social 
values. 
Friedmann argues for a constant critical evaluation and successive revision of the components 
in the model. This way, the social practise epistemology becomes a model for social learning 
where the learning happens with interaction between radical practise and critical reflection. 
The model shows that social practise grows through a continuous critical evaluation and 
successive revision of the components in the model as they malfunction. The model results in 
personal growth due to the fact that the participants tie together knowledge and actions when 
they alter between critical acknowledging and new practise. Friedmann suggests further that 
even if the epistemology regarding social practise accedes the epistemology dealing with 
objective knowledge, it is far from a substitute. Friedmann points out the following 
advantages of this model (1978:87): 
• Knowledge and actions can be tied to a model for democratic processes. 
• Knowledge grows from conflicting incidents and thus has a political dimension. 
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• Anyone who wants to can participate, and there exists no monopoly or distinguished 
elite. 
• The separation between objective and subjective knowledge disappears, and abstract 
and concrete knowledge is combined in a single process of learning and practising.  
• Normative contributions will not be smuggled in, but will openly be presented for 
criticism. 
• The model can be used in formulations of theories. What is learned in one situation 
can be abstract knowledge in another. 
 
Friedmann gets support for his ideas about the reflective practioner by among others Bolan 
(1980) who writes about the practitioner as theorist. He also starts by saying that the 
difference between theory and practise, knowledge and actions is bigger than ever. He asserts 
further that if we make planning a professional and instrumental problem-solver, one effect 
could be that citizens would become less self-sufficient and that they would come into a 
structural relationship of dependency towards professional helpers. This effect could 
eventually become stronger, making the distance between knowledge and actions even 
greater. He maintains that every incident is special, and the most meaningful theories are 
those that are constructed in the minds of the practitioners and that have been tried out in 
practise. He asserts that professional practise is guided by knowledge and that knowledge is 
formed by practise. However, norms, interests and values control actions, thus, the planner 
should not only be regarded as an instrumental planner but also as a politician representing 
norms, interests and values.  
Habermas joins the general critics of the modern society. He claims that the positivist 
cognitive theory increases the distance between theory and practice, and that the formation of 
policy in modern society is fragmented and instrumental. Habermas uses the terms system and 
life world to describe this development. By system he means economic and political-
administrative activity based on the steering media money and power, and demands for results 
aiming at the goals of functional ability and efficiency. This system is characterised by 
maximising of individual benefit and instrumental rationality, and it is capable of creating 
systemic integration. In the life world, co-ordinated action builds on consensus created on the 
basis of ideal conversations. The focus is on the participants, and they are involved in 
communicative relations with each other. This results in a social integration, as opposed to 
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systemic integration, and builds on an unspoken common evaluation of the situation, common 
goals and values, etc. The life world is tied to civil society and open, free, democratic 
processes. 
Habermas claims that the system colonises the life world, and that instrumental rationality 
thus displaces communicative rationality. As a counterweight to this development, he wants 
to strengthen the public sphere in society. By public sphere he means the social room created 
by actors acting communicatively. Thus, the public sphere does not become a separate 
institution or organisation to which we can relate by studying structure, processes, norms, 
rules etc. Public sphere is rather a network of communication and a process of interaction 
which assists in putting issues on the political agenda, ensures that solution are passed and 
implemented, but also that the consequences are debated and evaluated.  It is in the public 
sphere that moral judgements of what is fair, right, democratic etc. will be expressed most 
clearly. We can thus claim that the public sphere represents the centre of democracy (Eriksen 
1994:16), but it has to be added that the public sphere can be abused and manipulated, but it 
cannot be subjected to open pressure without the actors having to show themselves and so 
weaken the force of their arguments.  
Through his theory of communicative action, Habermas tries to develop concepts for 
understanding how norms and solidarity are created communally. In this lies an assumption 
that consensus is possible and that the actors want to achieve a common will. Many critics of 
such consensus building claim that this can be possible and desirable only in small groups. In 
his book “Between facts and norms”, Habermas returns to the problems he set out discussing 
in the fifties: i.e. the necessary conditions for rational communication on the problems of 
society, and the meaning of democracy (Habermas 1995). The perspective here is that with 
the construction of the democratic constitutional state in modern society, institutional 
arrangements for legitimising this constitutional state have arisen. The line of reasoning is that 
no external authorities exist which guarantee the legitimacy of the democratic constitutional 
state. It has to secure its legitimacy on its own through free processes of public will-formation. 
However, the public opinion-making process has little chance of being directly transformed 
into political action. The communicative power from the free opinion-making process in the 
political public sphere is through the passage of laws and regulations transformed into 
administrative power in the shape of state power to organise, sanction, and implement. This 
means that it is not the individual morality of the actors, which decides the ability to act 
collectively and in solidarity, but rather the procedures for democratic will-formation and 
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collective decision-making which is institutionalised in modern constitutional.  In this way, 
Habermas arrives at the normative point of view that society should vitalise the connection 
between civil society and the political system through institutional reforms.  
Habermas’ theory of communicative action tries to develop an extended universalistic concept 
of rationality, which not only covers instrumental rationality, but also communicative 
rationality (Habermas 1984, 1987). This is probably one reason why his theory is strongly 
criticised, but also eagerly embraced by many. A recurring line of argument in his works is 
based on the concepts speech act and communicative rationality. He proceeds from the basis 
that speech is an act. Whoever expresses himself verbally will through this speech act 
communicate a connection to an objective world of existing facts and circumstances, to a 
subjective world of personal experiences and emotions, and to a social world of accepted and 
valid norms. The listeners can evaluate how the statement relates to communicative validity 
claims, i.e. that a speech act must be true, sincere, right and comprehensible.  
The listeners have the option to contradict what is said by means of a new speech act, and the 
actors thus become involved in a process with a mutual duty to give arguments for one’s 
statements and with rules of procedure defined by the validity claims. To argue against these 
claims will mean involving oneself in contradictions. The actors thus do not relate their 
statements directly to existing self-interests or norms, but instead relate the statement to the 
possibility that the validity claims will be countered by others. In this way, the instrumental 
rationality with focus on facts and truth, meet with the communicative rationality with focus 
on sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility. Facts and truth are almost always depending 
on paradigmatic values, moral and views. That is why communicative rationality has to be 
made superior to the instrumental rationality (Habermas 1995, Friedmann 1992, Dryzek 
1990).   
The communicative rationality emphasises the meaningful and action-coordinating potential 
of the speech acts themselves.  Through discourse, the conversation partners may arrive at 
common understandings of correct action, by which one feels bound. Communicative 
rationality can contribute to building moral forming communities, and to integrate individual 
and collective values, interests and needs, but such a product assumes that the discourse can 
be understood as an ideal conversation that in addition to the duty to argue also builds on 
parity of power and public sphere.  
From the work of Habermas (1984, 1987 and 1995), one can draw the conditions for the 
undistorted discourse. All individuals who can speak and act are to be free to participate, free 
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to question any proposal, free to make any proposal, and free to express their attitudes, desires 
and needs. No speaker is to be hindered by force, either from inside or outside the discourse, 
from making use of these conditions. 
Parity of power is important for the conversation to become a dialogue where the force of 
argument in the relationship between the actors decides the outcome of the conversation, not 
the power of one participant to force his views and norms on others. Furthermore, the ideal 
conversation presupposes a public sphere, so that the duty to argue applies even outside this 
particular group of persons in this particular discourse. This means that none of the actors are 
to execute any power in the discourse that makes any other actor become structurally 
subordinate, and that the weightiest argument ideally should be given the most weight in the 
process of making consensus. The demand for reason together with the demand for publicity, 
force the participants to defend their statements towards citizens that are not taking part in the 
discourses.  
In this will-formating and legitimating model, Habermas talks about different discourses with 
their respective rationalities, which together form a political legitimating process. Habermas 
understands the political process as a will-forming process starting with pragmatic discourses 
that further leads to ethical and to moral discourses depending on the kinds of conflicts 
present. These discourses can lead to juridical discourses, which are oriented towards the 
consistence of laws and regulations. Procedure-regulated negotiation can be an alternative to 
discourses if these do not produce sufficient consensus (Eriksen 1994). 
However, ideal conversations and policy legitimating processes are not an easy way to create 
a regional collective will (Jacobsson 1997). In societies and communities which are based on 
democratically values, the communicative actions is the main approach to legitimating 
politics, laws and plans. Democracy and publicity is the best guarantee against illegitimate 
execution of power. 
Communicative planning is not carried out by experts for the object of the plan, but in face to 
face dialogue between those involved and interested. Personal growth and joint action are the 
key elements in this planning. The planning process transforms knowledge into action through 
an uninterrupted sequence of relationships between people. The planning is not divorced from 
other social action in which the aim is to gain control over social processes that effect one’s 
welfare. Communicative planning emphasises a broad grass-root mobilisation to gain the 
strength to take greater responsibility for one’s development and to influence the conditions 
under which one is working. Knowledge and action can be linked through critical 
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understanding and radical practice, and that the planning process is a far-reaching learning 
process in which everyone can participate. Without a vision there is no radical practice, 
without radical practice no formation of a theory, without a theory no strategy, and without a 
strategy no action. These relationships can be illustrated as a learning spiral (see figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: The communicative planning 
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Discourses, mobilisation, participation, partnership, action and learning are key issues in 
communicative planning, and the communicative planning is an institution building process. 
The process serves to build up social, institutional and political capacity, which can become a 
new local and regional institutional resource and political power.  Healey (1997:314) calls this 
a soft infrastructure, but without attention to the hard infrastructure represented by the formal 
policy structure, it will be difficult to change the current policy. These formal systems are 
often seen as immovable constraints that simply are just “there”. However, the 
communicative and institution building approach emphasis that the constraints are never 
fixed. They are social constructed and reconstructed through dialog, mobilisation and learning 
and by the use of social, political and administrative power.  
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Conclusions 
From my point of view the main questions in the HEPRO Healthy City project is how to 
empower individuals, organisations and communities so they can contribute to a sustainable 
public health policy in Europe. In order to achieve this it can be fruitful, as the HEPRO 
project does, to regard the project as a cross-sectoral and cross level policy making and 
institution building process supported by a circular planning approach. However, 
empowerment is used in different ways by different authors, and need to be clarified. The 
project understand empowerment as balanced combination of soft and hard infrastructure, or 
of top down and bottom up policy  and of instrumental and communicative rationality. There 
is no single answer on how this balance shall be, but need to be sort out in the actual situation 
and context. The implication of this understanding of empowerment is that after the project, 
the communities shall have a better capacity to lead themselves, to focus their challenges, 
organise themselves, implement actions and to learn from their experiences. To what extent 
the project has fulfilled this goal, is an empirical question that must be answered later.   
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